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In a recent paper Taylor has suggested that perennialist models are or should be resurgent 
within transpersonal psychology. However, perennialist models such as those of Wilber 
and Taylor are metaphysical philosophies of spirituality typical of New Age religions; while 
such systems may be studied by a psychology that considers human spirituality, they are not 
and should not be proffered as psychology. Claims that Taylor's soft perennialism are partly 
evidence based are compared with invalid claims that the narrative of Noah's flood or the 
Christian-based idea of intelligent design are partly evidence based. Critiques of Wilber's 
integral perennialism and Taylor's soft perennialism are offered, Taylor's defenses of his 
work are answered, his contributions are noted, and his concerns of inappropriate critique 
are rebutted. Taylor's model may be inspiring, but it is not scientific, and not psychological.
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Zombie Perennialism:
An Intelligent Design for Psychology?
A Further Response to Taylor's Soft Perennialism
The psychological study of spirituality sits somewhat awkwardly at the intersection of scientific rigor and multicultural creativity—
more so in the light of feminist and other postmodern 
challenges to universal or objective knowledge. Given 
that science is itself culturally and philosophically 
situated, should doors be thrown open to the 
construction of new contexts for the study of spirituality, 
regardless of whether these meet rational criteria of 
intellectual rigor? Should a transpersonal psychology, 
for example, embrace alternate philosophies in a post-
truth spirit (Higgins, 2016), where content is no more 
important than packaging and fact earns no greater due 
than appearance? This question is particularly salient in 
relationship to Wilber’s metaphysically based integral 
psychology, as well as current efforts to create a new 
version of a similarly perennialist vision (e.g., Taylor, 
2016).
While it is arguable from a postmodern 
perspective that there can be many philosophical 
containers, none of which carries more objective 
authority than another, this  does not make all 
knowledge systems equally reliable. Psychology sits 
within the contingencies of a scientific context that can 
and likely should be informed and modified by feminist, 
participatory, and postmodern critiques and broadened 
through multicultural engagement in ways that mitigate 
some of the limitations imposed by the particulars of 
Western culture and modernist philosophy. Yet the valid 
concern that cultural and philosophical values may 
influence scientific process should be seen as a limitation 
to be acknowledged and perhaps partially remedied 
rather than as justification to invent metaphysically 
based systems and represent them as valid by standards of 
empirical science or psychology, or even as intellectually 
rigorous postmetaphysical thought. By these standards 
Wilber’s (e.g., 2000a, 2006) integral theory and Taylor’s 
(2016) soft perennialism are both inspiring philosophies 
of spirituality, but neither as yet finds solid footing as a 
psychological approach to human spirituality.
In order to qualify for inclusion as psychology, 
an idea needs to meet certain standards. One of the most 
basic of these is that explanations cannot be metaphysical 
in the sense that they appeal to causes on the basis of 
authority or tradition rather than evidence of the sort 
anyone could examine for themselves if they took the 
trouble to do so. Explanations based on causes for which 
there likely can be no direct evidence are more typical of 
religious knowledge. For example, the Genesis story of 
the creation of rainbows is an explanation of this type. 
According to this eloquent literary account, rainbows 
were divinely created at the end of Noah’s flood as a 
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sign that God would never again destroy the earth with 
a deluge (Genesis 9:12-17). Just as meteorologists cannot 
accept the Genesis report to explain a particular type of 
weather event, so psychology cannot accept explanations 
of this type for psychological phenomena—not even in 
a psychological approach to spirituality. Psychology can 
examine the content, implications, and heuristic value 
of metaphysical accounts, but it cannot offer them as 
psychological explanations. If it were to do so, it would 
be creating a de facto religious system and proffering it 
in the name of scientific psychology—which is clearly 
inappropriate. 
This distinction is particularly important for 
transpersonal psychology, given that it has been validly 
critiqued for attempting to “integrate religiously-based 
theories into secular psychology” (Hanegraaf, 1998, p. 
51), perhaps even providing something of a template for 
New Age religions. In such movements, entrepreneurs 
function as experts who disembed cultural elements 
of, for example, Indian, Chinese, or Native American 
origin, and create “radically recontextualized versions 
of how these cultural elements should be understood”; 
these new narratives “require faith in their veracity, 
and not hermeneutic suspicion” (Hammer, 2001, p. 
46).  Adherents to such religions may prefer the term 
spirituality to refer to what has been identified as 
secularized esotericism (Hanegraaf, 1998), yet the 
typical need for faith in esoteric forces or patterns 
or interpretations substantiates the religious label. 
As noted by Hanegraaf (1998) in reference to some 
strains of transpersonal psychology, “the transpersonal 
school, positing the perennial philosophy as the proper 
foundation of scientific research, has resulted in an 
openly religionist psychology” (p. 51). 
That the field has in some measure strayed 
into metaphysical beliefs more characteristic of religion 
than psychology does not mean it should give up on 
the careful study of subtle, profound, or elevated states 
of consciousness or mystical, spiritual, and exceptional 
experiences and capacities as crucial aspects of the whole 
person. In popular thought these phenomena are often 
somewhat misleadingly described as metaphysical, 
so there can be a concern that stepping back from 
metaphysics might mean abandoning the very sorts 
of topics that first inspired a transpersonal approach. 
Abstaining from metaphysics refers instead to setting 
aside a certain category of explanation for these 
phenomena. 
For any phenomenon there can be and often 
are scores of different explanations. In authoritarian 
societies determinations of which explanations are better 
typically come from those in power. Traditional societies, 
as the name suggests, usually make traditions the basis 
for such judgments. In a scientific society, it is evidence 
rather than religious authority or tradition that tends to 
prevail. In medieval Europe, the ability to rely on direct 
observation rather than ecclesiastic or feudal authority 
was revolutionary and in some ways emancipatory (cf. 
Ferrer, 2002). The Copernican cosmological revision—
though it may have been less of a revolution and more 
of an incremental advance due to significant reliance on 
earlier Arabic astronomers (Ragep, 2007)—led eventually 
to a model in which Earth revolves around the Sun rather 
than vice versa. This was a triumph of data over dogma: 
facts from observations that anyone who extended the 
effort could make for themselves (assuming they had 
the necessary social status and resources) were used to 
overthrow the authority of religious power structures 
that had held sway for centuries. In a sense, then, science 
represented a democratization of knowledge, and in 
democratic societies science has largely come to be the 
arbiter of which explanations are better. As such, ideas in 
psychology need to be amenable to some form of evidence 
that anyone might be able to examine for themselves, and 
psychology rejects metaphysical explanations because 
they cannot be challenged in this way. To ask that 
psychology set aside this test (e.g., Cunningham, 2015; 
Slife, Hope, & Nebeker, 1999; Taylor, 2017a) is to miss 
that this criterion is the very demarcation of a scientific 
approach that defines both its strength and its limits.
Of course, science has never been purely 
about evidence: it also includes strains of authority 
and tradition. For example, modernist Western 
philosophy—a traditional way of thinking for which 
there cannot be any independent evidence—is arguably 
responsible for certain assumptions generally taken 
for granted in scientific work: atomistic materialism 
(Slife, Hope, & Nebeker, 1999) and Cartesian-Kantian 
dualism (Ferrer, 2000, 2002; Tarnas, 1991) are instances 
that readily come to mind. Knowledge that does not 
conform to these expectations is typically rejected or 
marginalized, regardless of its merit on other grounds.
Transpersonal scholars often point to the fact 
that psychology’s adoption of modernist assumptions 
may artificially narrow the range of evidence considered 
(e.g., Hartelius, 2014a). Specifically, there is concern that 
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mystical, spiritual, and other exceptional human states, 
experiences, and capacities are wrongly pathologized 
or marginalized as misattributions (e.g., Grof, 2013; 
Wiseman & Watt, 2006). For example, the entire field of 
parapsychology has been necessitated not by an absence 
of experimental evidence or rigor, but on the basis that 
the field examines phenomena that have been ruled out 
a priori by scientific expectations rooted in a Western 
worldview (Allison, 1979; Irwin, 2007). Particularly 
in the face of imperatives for psychology to develop in 
ways that reflect more than Western culture, the scope of 
empirical work considered to be valid may need to expand 
beyond these particular cultural boundaries (cf. Fowers 
& Davidov, 2006; Fowers & Richardson, 1996; Howard, 
2003; Koltko-Rivera, 2004; Pedrotti & Edwards, 2014). 
Yet such extensions need to be approached carefully, so 
that rigor and integrity are maintained.
One approach to this challenge in whole person 
approaches such as transpersonal and humanistic 
psychologies has been to focus on a study of lived 
experience using phenomenological and other forms of 
qualitative research (cf. Slife, Hope, & Nebeker, 1999). 
Through careful attention to sensate details of particular 
types of experience, psychological knowledge can be 
constructed in ways that may be less shaped by modernist 
or other specific worldviews and more by prereflective 
experiences that may retain greater similarity across 
cultural diversities. In addition there are approaches 
to quantifying complex qualitative data (Hartelius, 
2015a; Pekala, 1995a, 1995b; Pekala & Kumar, 2000, 
2007). With these rich resources available, it becomes 
possible to at least entertain notions such as  James’ 
(1904a, 1904b) radical empiricism, which held that 
only elements capable of being directly experienced 
should be considered by science—and, more radically, 
that all such elements should be considered, including 
the experienced relations between them (cf. Laughlin 
& McManus, 1995; Taylor, 1994). Despite occasional 
concerns that some experiences may be ineffable (e.g., 
Osborne, 2013), there are adequate ways to convey 
something of substance about a great number of human 
experiences, whether mundane or exceptional. 
Philosophies of mind and of spirituality still 
deserve inclusion in discussions within transpersonal 
psychology, as these have been of interest from the field’s 
earliest days. Moreover, every psychology is likely to have 
some implied philosophical assumptions. However, the 
legacy of Wilber’s work raises questions about whether it 
is psychology—even transpersonal psychology—when 
metaphysical philosophies of spirituality are woven 
together with psychological theories in ways that create 
systems indistinguishable from New Age religions 
(cf. Hanegraaff, 2009). Transpersonal psychology has 
critiqued the imposition of explicitly modernist values 
in the supposedly neutral domain of science, and has 
sought to learn from spiritual traditions what wisdom 
they might carry for addressing challenges of the human 
mind and heart. Honoring this diversity of expressions 
of spirituality, or even adopting insights and practices 
from traditional contexts, is quite a different thing 
from inventing systems that rely on essentially (and 
essentialist) religious ideas and presenting them as if they 
were scientifically validated approaches to psychology. 
Creations such as Wilber’s perennialist New Age 
religion can be respectfully studied by a transpersonal 
psychology, but it is doubtful whether any of these 
should also be presented as a transpersonal psychology.
This matter gains relevance in light of Taylor’s 
(2017a, this issue) suggestion that perennialism is or 
should be on the rise within transpersonal psychology. 
With this optimistic suggestion he offers his own version, 
soft perennialism, as successor to the work of Wilber, 
which has been the target of considerable substantive 
critique over the past several decades (e.g., Falk, 2009; 
Ferrer, 1998, 2002, 2011a; Hartelius, 2015a; Hartelius & 
Ferrer, 2015; Rothberg, Kelly, & Kelly, 1998; Schneider, 
1989). Taylor deserves credit for original and creative 
ideas, and his effort to reconcile participatory and 
perennialist thought is a worthy goal. However, a careful 
analysis demonstrates that the structure of his model 
is perennialist to much the same degree as Wilber’s, 
and largely subject to the same critiques. In place of 
Wilber’s transcendent nondual, Taylor has proposed 
an immanent and all-pervasive spiritual force—what 
amounts to a metaphysical interpretation of a particular 
category of phenomenal experience. This force may 
be experienced from many different locations on the 
landscape of experience, producing the variations one 
sees in religions. Taylor’s thought is as yet in early stages, 
and his combination of phenomenological research with 
participatory thought shows some promise—sans its 
perennialist superstructure—as a transpersonal approach. 
In its present form, however, the most promising portions 
of Taylor’s approach is little more than a potentially 
helpful topographical metaphor that may be worthy of 
future development in Taylor’s thought. 
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Given transpersonal psychology’s troubled 
history with Wilber’s system, it seems unlikely that 
resurrected or undead forms of perennialism will roam 
the field’s landscape in great numbers anytime soon. 
Nor does this seem a helpful strategy for the field. 
If transpersonal psychology continues to expend its 
credibility on grand metaphysical theories and New Age 
religions, it will have little left for its potentially  vital 
role in contributing to a whole person psychology in 
ways that can directly impact the daily lives of hundreds 
of millions of people who find their experiences and 
capacities marginalized or pathologized. 
Making Sense of Spiritual Diversity
Years ago I watched a documentary on life in a cave deep inside a mountain, accessible only by means 
of an underground river. The fact that sightless insects 
and other organisms had adapted to the very specific 
conditions of this location in remarkable ways opened 
my mind to the riotous variegations of life—how every 
location bursts with creative expressions of the pulsing 
rhythms of organic ingenuity. This is no less true for 
human spirituality than it is for biological diversity, 
evident not only between traditions but within them. 
For example, Hinduism is often thought of as a single 
tradition, yet the term is less than 200 years old (Flood, 
1996), and originally referred to a broad variety of local 
traditions in regions east of the Indus river (cf. Gellner, 
2005).  
This diversity has posed a challenge for modern 
disciplines of (primarily Western) scholarship. How does 
one explain the fact that spiritual traditions consistently 
refer to experiences that are somehow not part of ordinary 
reality, yet describe them in such inconsistent ways? How 
can one make sense of experiences, practices, narratives, 
and beliefs that are so diverse, and yet seem to share some 
ephemeral commonalities? Transpersonal psychology 
has held the position that spirituality is an aspect of the 
whole person, and that its stories and practices may point 
to real human capacities related to exceptional states of 
consciousness. This perspective is broader than that of 
orthodox religion, which typically bestows reality on 
only one tradition and assumes other religions to be false 
or misleading. It is also in some degree of tension with 
views based in science or the humanities that reduce 
spirituality to illusory constructions, denying it any form 
of reality other than what it may enjoy within the fabric 
of the stories that societies tell themselves. This situation 
has led some transpersonal scholars to seek explanatory 
frameworks beyond conventional approaches.
For Abraham Maslow (1962/1968, 1969, 1970), 
this meant expanding psychology beyond a focus on 
pathology and a so-called objectivity that treated persons 
uncaringly as if they were objects or animals. He believed 
that humans had unique capacities—what he referred to 
as “the farther reaches of human nature” (1969, p. 1)—
and that these were natural and empirical aspects that 
psychology could address through a properly attuned 
scientific approach (1970). However, Maslow died in 
1970, just one year after the founding of the Journal of 
Transpersonal Psychology.
If Maslow, the most influential founder, had 
survived for another decade, his research background in 
primate behavior and motivation might have guided the 
field toward the kinds of empirical approaches suited to a 
transpersonal psychology. With his passing much of the 
field embarked on a new direction, guided by the vision 
of a young Ken Wilber. In his first scholarly offering, 
Wilber (1975) proposed that just as developmental 
psychology traces the development of the individual 
through ego maturation, so a perennial philosophy—or 
philosophia perennis—could be grafted on as an extension 
into beyond-ego or post-conventional development—
what he called a psychologia perennis.
Wilber’s Integral:
A New Age Religion 
That Wanted to Be a Psychology
Perennial philosophy holds that all spiritual traditions are reflections of a single underlying truth, a 
view that arose out of medieval efforts to reconcile 
Christian theology with Judaism and Platonic thought 
(Schmidt-Biggemann, 2004). Prior to Wilber, versions 
of perennialism were adopted by movements such as 
romanticism, American transcendentalism (Hanegraaff, 
2009), theosophy (Partridge, 2013), and the traditionalist 
school of esoteric thought (Diaz, 2014); such views were 
expounded by early 20th century figures such as Evelyn 
Underhill (Stoeber, 2013), Edgar Cayce (Hanegraaff, 
2009), and Aldous Huxley (1945). Wilber’s work applied 
this impulse from popular American culture to the 
fledgling field of transpersonal psychology.
This is not to say that empirical research died 
out entirely from transpersonal scholarship. While an 
informal review of transpersonal journals will turn up 
a modest if growing percentage of empirical papers 
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(Hartelius, Rothe, & Roy, 2015), scholars such as Harris 
Friedman (2002, 2015) and Douglas MacDonald (2013) 
have consistently advocated for transpersonal psychology 
as a science. Others, such as Charles Tart and Dean 
Radin, have adopted what might be called an empirically 
agnostic parapsychology framework within which to 
conduct research on a wide variety of transpersonal 
topics. At the same time, Friedman has received strong 
critique of his support of empirical work within the 
field (e.g., Ferrer, 2014), despite his qualification that 
commitments to science should not be ideological (i.e., 
scientism; Friedman, 2002).
Wilber’s perennialist initative attempted to go 
beyond a modest critique or qualification of science as 
offered by Maslow, or later by Friedman, and instead 
situated the field within an alternate philosophical frame. 
Compared with the agnostic stance of parapsychology, 
which simply sets aside a potentially limited materialist 
philosophy implicit in much of psychology, the 
suggestion that all spiritual paths lead toward an actual 
shared spiritual reality represented what seemed like a 
bold advance that affirmed human spirituality without 
privileging any particular tradition. For some years 
Wilber’s model was widely accepted within the field 
(Needleman & Eisenberg, 1987; Rothberg, 1986). By at 
least the early 2000s, the shortcomings of perennialism 
generally, and Wilber’s work in particular, had come into 
clearer view (Ferrer, 1998, 2000, 2002; Rothberg et al., 
1998; Schneider, 1989).
With the benefit of historical perspective, it is 
possible to recognize that this philosophical initiative 
was problematic from its inception. In addition to 
the numerous issues identified by Ferrer (2000, 2002, 
2011a), perennialism is a metaphysical philosophy of 
spirituality whereas psychology is an empirical study of 
the human mind and its expressions. While each of these 
projects is valid in its own right, Wilber’s syncretic effort 
to meld the two merely deposited versions of science and 
religion into a shared container and papered over the top 
so as to obscure the divide that persists between them.
Wilber’s system, a complex, convoluted, and 
confidently asserted construction, remains rife with 
deeply problematic fissures. A review of these requires 
more time and attention than would otherwise be 
warranted for a project with such extensive flaws. Yet 
in some sense the sheer scope of Wilber’s undertaking 
constitute grounds for careful consideration. Howard 
Hughes’ massive ocean-going seaplane known as the 
Spruce Goose, which earned a place in history even 
though it reportedly never flew more than a mile or 
gained more than 70 feet of altitude, provides an apt 
metaphor for Wilber’s monumental if dubious efforts. 
Given the current impulse to revive perennialist ideas 
within the transpersonal field (Taylor, 2016, 2017a), 
such an exercise also seems timely, since some of the 
weaknesses inherent in Wilber’s approach endure into 
efforts at reformulation.  
The term integral suggests inclusion of everything 
essential for completeness. With this name Wilber 
(2000a) has seemed to propose that his all-quadrant all-
level (AQAL) model is actually a complete psychology, 
“embracing the enduring insights of premodern, 
modern, and postmodern sources” (p. 5). His AQAL 
model looks to be an adaptation of Schumacher’s (1977) 
four fields of knowledge: the inner awareness of oneself, 
the inner experiences of others, considering oneself from 
an objective perspective, and a study of the external 
world (cf. Ferrer, 2017). These are arranged in quadrant 
form, with the two left-hand quadrants representing 
the interior of the individual (upper left) and of groups 
(lower left); the two right-hand quadrants represent the 
exterior of the individual (upper right) and of groups 
(lower right). Added to this are lines from the center 
of the diagram to the exterior corner of each quadrant, 
representing corresponding forms of development or 
evolution. Because he has been able to sort a wide variety 
of phenomena into this grid based on just three variables 
(singular/plural, interior/exterior, and developmental 
lines), Wilber (e.g., 2000b) has represented this as a 
comprehensive map of knowledge.
Contemplating aspects of developmental 
psychology, evolution, and esoteric philosophy within 
the same rubric is certainly thought provoking. However, 
the fact that quite different types of things can be sorted 
onto the same grid based on a few simple variables does 
not in itself integrate these into a consistent or meaningful 
whole. For example, developmental psychology does not 
become compatible with the metaphysical philosophy of 
perennialism just because the two are placed contiguously 
on a line in a diagram; nor is the tension between 
subjective and objective categories resolved by situating 
two quadrants representing subjective perspectives next 
to two representing objective views.
What holds together these disparate elements 
in Wilber’s model is his concept of the nondual. The 
nondual is the ultimate reality and the source of 
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies 98 Hartelius
the four quadrants (Wilber, 2006, p. 288); it is the 
endpoint of spiritual evolution (p. 102), and it is a state 
of consciousness that unites subject and object (p. 110). 
Because subjective and objective quadrants arise from 
this same source, their apparent tension is resolved; 
because all of creation is evolving toward this same goal, 
psychological development and philosophies of spiritual 
evolution can be grafted together as different parts of the 
path to that goal. Without the nondual, a common New 
Age religious concept (Versluis, 2014), these ill-fitting 
conjoinings do not work, and Wilber’s system is little 
more than an intriguing way to associate things that may 
that this process results in some correspondence with 
an external, objective reality; Rorty argued that this 
assumption is false, and that scientific knowledge, as 
any other form of constructed knowledge, is established 
only within the meaning fabric of its community or 
culture. Rorty himself envisioned that this would lead 
to knowledges that embrace their own contingencies 
(O’Shea, 1995). Habermas (2006) has suggested that, 
in place of seeking reference to an objective world, 
postmetaphysical knowledge might “become self-
critically aware of its boundaries” by “reconstruct[ing] 
the history of its own genesis” (p. 16). Such approaches 
to knowledge might engage with others, the world, and 
existence itself in ways that Heidegger has described as 
immediate and relational, even revelatory, rather than 
calculated and circumscribed (Smith, 1991).
Wilber’s approach to postmetaphysics acknow-
ledges the embeddedness of knowledge in bodies 
and cultures (Esbjörn-Hargens & Wilber, 2006), but 
apparently considers situating variously-embodied 
knowledges within his four-quadrant framework an 
adequate substitute for any actual integration. While 
locating perspectives relative to a simple grid may be 
helpful by placing them within a particular given frame, 
any such frame is itself a perspective that has its own 
history and contingencies—a fact that Wilber (2006) 
has seemed to deny by identifying the integral stage 
of development—ostensibly represented by his integral 
framework—as “aperspectival” (pp. 242, 243). In this 
way Wilber has exempted his own AQAL framework 
from the necessary constraints of postmetaphysics, while 
simultaneously claiming to be postmetaphysical.
Wilber’s position seems to be that his four-
quadrant model is aperspectival, perhaps because of a 
sense that it has emerged on its own from the data of 
spiritual traditions through his engagement with this 
material, and as corroborated by so-called “perennial 
sages” (2000a, p. 8). If this were so, it would seem that 
the integral theory framework must reflect reality in 
some profound way. Yet his claim that this knowledge 
has some factual correspondence with objective reality 
is precisely the sort of metaphysically naïve stance—
following Rorty’s definition of metaphysical—that 
Wilber has claimed to transcend.
The implied assertion that integral theory 
constitutes an inherently integrating context may come 
from the idea that “all four [of Wilber’s] quadrants co-arise 
and are different aspects of the same occasion” (Esbjörn-
or may not be related.
Yet the nondual is a metaphysical concept, an 
idea for which by definition there can be no more direct 
evidence than there is for, say, God. Given this challenge, 
what Wilber (2000a) has offered as verification for 
this claim is, first, that the pattern he has perceived in 
his study of spiritual traditions is consistent with his 
theory, and second, that in his readings he has found 
that others have reported what seems to him a similar 
pattern. The fact that Wilber sees patterns in the data 
that confirm his ideas—whether directly in his readings 
of and about traditions or in the opinions of others—
is hardly compelling evidence for so large a claim. This 
form of self-confirmation does not rise to being “some 
version of ... objective evidence” (Wilber, 2006, p. 
234) that Wilber has acknowledged as necessary. His 
contention that “the discovery of these waves, over the 
years, has been communally generated and consensually 
validated” (Wilber, 2000a, p. 8) similarly comes with 
no supporting evidence that this is the case. As such, 
the essential concept that makes Wilber’s grand scheme 
work relies primarily on Wilber’s assertion that it is so. 
Generally, when a scholar bases an entire theory 
on a concept for which there can be no substantive 
evidence, the theory fails. Perhaps in part to distract 
from this challenge, Wilber has made the claim that 
his work is not metaphysical but postmetaphysical. 
Postmetaphysical as a term has gained currency in the 
wake of Richard Rorty’s (1979) first book, Philosophy and 
the Mirror of Nature, that effectively shifted from critique 
of particular epistemologies to a careful dismantling of 
the enterprise of situating knowledge on some ahistorical 
and transcultural basis of objective fact. In this context 
the term metaphysical is used with a different meaning, 
referring to the assumption that the scientific project of 
grounding knowledge in empirical evidence assumes 
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies 99Zombie Perennialism
Hargens & Wilber, 2006, p. 544), which seems to be a 
more developed version of Wilber’s (1977) early vision 
that subjectivity and objectivity reflect complementary 
aspects of a primary dualism arising out of the ultimate 
reality of nondual awareness. The notion of considering 
together various types of knowledge is far from original; 
the claim that simply placing subjective and objective 
approaches in proximal quadrants will restore some 
primordial unity may be overly optimistic, and again 
reflects the metaphysical origins of Wilber’s work in 
two senses: it assumes an intimate correspondence 
between subjectivity and objectivity (metaphysical in 
Rorty’s sense), and it postulates an ultimate reality for 
which there can be no public evidence (metaphysical 
in a more conventional sense). His later addition of 
intersubjective and interobjective approaches (Esbjörn-
Hargens & Wilber, 2006) adds complexity, but neither 
resolution or clarity. It seems safe to conclude that 
Wilber’s integral approach is not postmetaphysical, even 
by its own definitions of that term. An authentically 
postmetaphysical approach might extend Rorty’s 
critique of mind as a mirror of nature by “put[ting] to 
rest the equally problematic image of contemplative or 
visionary ‘consciousness as mirror of spirit’ implicit in 
much classical and contemporary spiritual discourse” 
(Ferrer, 2017, p. 193); however, such a stance would 
discredit Wilber’s entire system.
This is but one of the key failures of integral 
theory. The fact that multiple philosophies and 
spiritualities are considered makes it in some ways 
encyclopedic, but this is different than containing 
everything necessary for a comprehensive map of 
knowledge, or even for a complete psychology; in this 
sense Wilber’s approach is not meaningfully integral. Its 
solution to subject-object dualism and spiritual diversity 
relies on a perennialist notion of transcendent nondual 
reality that has more in common with religion than with 
science or scholarship or a psychology (cf. Hartelius & 
Ferrer, 2015). Assertions that the approach is supported 
by objective evidence fall well short, as do claims that 
it is not metaphysical, or that it is not perennialist (cf. 
Hartelius, 2015a). 
Each of these questionable claims has been 
advanced with clever turns of phrase that do not stand 
up to critical examination. Some years ago at a state fair 
I purchased a set of six kitchen knives that, according to 
the enthusiastic salesman, never needed sharpening. I got 
more than my money’s worth in years of use, but only 
later learned that these knives did not need sharpening 
because they could not be sharpened. By at times using 
arguments akin to a sales pitch designed to conceal 
flaws rather than illuminate, Wilber’s work appears to 
have more in common with a professionally marketed 
commercial product than a carefully constructed area of 
knowledge. As a product, Wilber’s integral theory may 
in fact be quite satisfactory for some popular audiences 
(Hartelius, 2015a), but it is crucial that within scholarly 
fields its nature be clearly discerned. 
Taylor’s Soft Perennialism:
Another New Age Religion
With Psychology Aspirations
While Wilber’s ideas are no longer dominant within transpersonal psychology (cf. Ferrer, 2011b), 
Taylor (2016) has offered a revised, soft perennialism 
that proposes a varied landscape of spiritual paths 
and destinations rather than a single transcendent 
ultimate. In response to recent critique (Hartelius, 
2016), Taylor (2017a, this issue) has offered an extended 
clarifying response. With some caveats, Taylor’s revised 
explanation of his landscape metaphor of spiritual paths 
seems potentially compatible both with scientific inquiry 
into certain types of spiritual experience as state-specific 
phenomena (Hartelius, 2007, 2015b; Tart, 1972; Varela, 
1996), as well as with participatory approaches (cf. Ferrer, 
2017) within which a state of consciousness could be one 
aspect of an individual’s locatedness (Hartelius, 2015b; 
Hartelius & Ferrer, 2015). This part of his approach 
does not qualify as perennialist in any conventional 
sense, and is well within the range of other transpersonal 
approaches. 
A second major element in Taylor’s (2016) soft 
perennialism is his claim that from different locations 
on this experiential landscape, an all-pervasive spiritual 
force or spiritual energy will be perceived differently—to 
some it will appear as an ultimate transcendent reality, 
as in Wilber’s perennialism; to others it may appear in 
other forms. This notion, which in his response (2017a) 
he acknowledges as explicitly metaphysical, is apparently 
his effort to reconcile participatory and perennialist 
approaches. 
While Taylor (2016) has echoed several 
important critiques of Wilber, his attempt at a solution 
follows Wilber’s strategy of resorting to a metaphysical 
concept that cannot be independently verified or 
falsified (more on Taylor’s stance toward science later) 
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as a way to resolve otherwise incommensurable elements. 
With the addition of this metaphysical claim, it gains a 
structure that directly parallels Wilber’s integral theory: 
a metaphysical constant that can be experienced from 
multiple standpoints. For Wilber, the constant is a 
singular, transcendent nondual that can be perceived and 
described from various cultural locations; for Taylor it is 
an all-pervading spiritual force that can be experienced 
and described from various experiential locations. 
The perennialism of Taylor’s version is 
constructed differently than Wilber’s, and following 
Daniels’ (2005, 2009; cf. Wilber, 1995) distinction 
between paths that ascend toward transcendence and 
those that descend toward underlying immanence, might 
be characterized as a descending perennialism, in contrast 
with Wilber’s ascending perennialism. Although Taylor’s 
(2016) perennialism appears novel in some aspects, and 
might warrant the creation of another category in Ferrer’s 
(2002) typology of perennialisms, it does not seem softer, 
in the sense of less problematically metaphysical, than 
Wilber’s. 
Given the perennialist nature of its overall 
structure, Taylor’s (2016) soft perennialism is necessarily 
subject to many of the same critiques as Wilber’s integral 
perennialism (e.g., Ferrer, 2000, 2011a; Hartelius & Ferrer, 
2015), or as Taylor has referred to it, hard perennialism. 
Taylor’s argument is that his own metaphysical claims 
are not entirely speculative because they are congruent 
with empirical phenomenological data, and therefore are 
“to some degree evidence-based” (p. 82). This is a key 
assertion that deserves careful consideration, resonating 
as it does with Wilber’s claim that his approaches to 
validation represent some version of objective evidence. 
I was educated in a conservative community 
that believed Earth was created in seven literal days, 
and that Noah built a wooden ark that saved human 
and animal life from a flood that covered the entire 
planet. According to this view, paleontologists who take 
fossils and other materials as evidence of evolution are 
misreading the catastrophic aftermath of the biblical 
flood. For example, in a college course I learned that 
bible-believing scholars have argued for flood-friendly 
explanations of fossil forests—continuing an interpretive 
tradition that reaches back to at least the 17th century 
(Gastaldo, 1999). Fossil records in some areas have been 
seen as representing numerous forests that grew one 
after another, punctuated by some form of destruction, 
creating geological records spanning tens of thousands of 
years. But if there had been a worldwide flood, perhaps 
these same features might have been created by log mats, 
clusters of stumps from the destruction of the planet’s 
forests that may have aggregated in certain areas due 
to currents in the receding waters of Noah’s flood (cf. 
Oard & Giesecke, 2007). When my sources extended 
beyond this carefully curated evidence, it slowly became 
apparent that these so-called creation scientists were 
in fact searching the literature for evidence that might 
somehow be read in ways that supported their prior 
beliefs, or for minor inconsistencies that could be used 
to challenge the prevailing view of a geological history 
reaching back longer than a miraculous divine creation 
of the world some 6,000 years ago. Highly selective 
readings of empirical evidence do not turn the exquisite 
mythic narratives of the Genesis creation stories into 
geological history. Yet following Taylor’s (2017a) example, 
such efforts—as well as many far more inflammatory 
half-truths—could be misleadingly afforded the status 
of being "evidence-based” (p. 86). 
As this example demonstrates, the issue is not 
just about empirical evidence itself, but also the lens 
through which facts are viewed. Intelligent design is a now-
discredited effort to use scientific research in support of 
metaphysical ideas drawn from biblical creationism (e.g., 
Wells, 2000; cf. Coyne, 2001). In doing so, intelligent 
design used scientific fact, but attempted to interject 
an interpretive lens based in an entirely religious idea. 
The result is not so much a conciliation of science and 
religion as the subversion of scientific evidence in support 
of a religious vision. One might make a similar case 
regarding Wilber’s incorporation of psychology in a New 
Age religious system based on the nondual; Taylor’s soft 
perennialism is, in like manner, a religious model based 
on an immanent, all-pervading spiritual force, that has 
incorporated phenomenological studies of a particular 
type of (sometimes) spiritual experience. Of course, 
religious ideas deserve full appreciation and respect, but 
as religious ideas, not as scientific or psychological ones, 
not even when they claim an unverifiable relationship to 
empirical data.
In fact, it is the nature of metaphysical concepts 
within religions to explain some mundane experience 
through appeal to a hidden or undemonstrable cause. In 
this way, virtually every such idea is related to empirically 
observable phenomena. For example, in Navajo tradition 
the presence of people is explained by their predecessors, 
the insect-like air-spirit people or Níłch’ i dinè é, who 
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emerged from deep within the earth (Zolbrod, 1987); in 
ancient Near Eastern tradition weather events are caused 
by a storm god, often Baal (Green, 2003); and in the text 
of the biblical book of Genesis the origin of humans is 
ascribed to divine creation by either Elohim or Yahweh. In 
each of these cases a religious idea is in some sense based 
on empirical phenomena, yet it would be extraordinary 
to claim that this fact constitutes empirical evidence 
for the associated religious concepts. For example, the 
presence of humans today is not evidence that the Níłch’ i 
dinè é existed in the past in some Western historical 
sense. The fact that Wilber’s (2006) and Taylor’s (2016) 
metaphysical ideas are, similarly, extrapolations from 
empirical and experiential evidence does not make these 
ideas any less metaphysical, or any more empirically 
based.
Taylor (2016, 2017a, 2017b) has presented some 
empirical evidence, and its strength and import deserves 
close attention, since he has placed such emphasis on 
this feature. On the basis of preliminary evidence for 
a type of experience that at least does not conflict with 
his soft perennialism, he has claimed that these findings 
constitute some degree of empirical evidence for his 
metaphysical theory. If one postulates a theory and then 
finds empirical evidence that supports that theory, this 
would seem to constitute meaningful confirmation. Yet 
evidence that a type of experience occurs is not evidence 
for any particular explanation of that experience or 
theory about its significance. For example, someone who 
believed Earth had been visited by alien space travelers 
in the ancient past might point to the Uffington White 
Horse—a (likely) ancient stylized figure of a horse in 
England’s Berkshire Downs formed by trenches filled 
with white chalk and stretching longer than a football 
field—as an example of art that must have been designed 
to be seen from high above. Yet just because such a chalk 
figure could be made to fit within a theory about alien 
space visitors does not make it into evidence that such 
visitors existed. Taylor has offered empirical evidence, but 
it is evidence for the existence of a type of experience, 
not for his perennialist explanations of that experience. In 
this sense, the evidence that Taylor has offered does not 
even apply to his soft perennialism, let alone support it.
Taylor is not the first to conflate an experience 
with a metaphysical claim about that experience. 
Cunningham (2015) has made the argument, based on 
a Jamesian radical empiricism stance, that transpersonal 
experiences can reveal “transcendental realities” (p. 104), 
and that because the channeled materials attributed to 
the purported entity named Seth have a certain coherence 
and impact it is inexcusable to claim that this entity is 
unreal. However, the Seth materials are only empirical 
evidence of an experience or process that resulted in these 
materials, not in the literal reality of the disembodied 
entity to which they are ascribed. Until and unless relevant 
evidentiary processes can be developed for validating 
this latter claim, it remains entirely metaphysical. If I 
were to claim that chickens have feathers because these 
were a gift from Hermes, winged messenger of the 
gods, photographic evidence of chickens with feathers 
would not constitute empirical evidence for the god 
Hermes or for the divine origin of chicken feathers. If 
Cunningham (2015) has intended this argument for 
the reality of the Seth entity as an example of what he 
named transpersonal empiricism, then the latter appears 
to be a practice of uncritically commingling empirical 
data with metaphysical interpretations of those data—a 
practice to be scrupulously avoided (Hartelius, 2016)—
rather than a meaningful form of empiricism.
This is not to suggest that all of Taylor’s work 
is equally problematic. His approach contains two 
quite different strategies that neatly illustrate what may 
be a useful divide between science and religion in a 
transpersonal psychology. His landscape metaphor, in 
which there are many potential ranges of exceptional 
human experience and even more paths through them, 
allows for spiritual diversity and also situates such 
experiences within the domain of what a psychology may 
be able to encompass. His all-pervasive spiritual force, 
on the other hand, is a metaphysical interpretation of 
phenomenological experience that is firmly in line with 
religious thought. By attempting the worthy project of 
reconciling a participatory approach with a perennialist 
model, Taylor has succeeded only in creating a new 
form of perennialism. While this may be rightly valued 
in the domain of popular spirituality, it is likely not a 
psychology—transpersonal or otherwise. 
There is a subtle but crucial concern to be 
addressed here: A transpersonal psychology has interest 
in the culturally situated approaches to mental and 
emotional difficulties that are often contained within 
spiritual traditions, including the hermeneutical value of 
explicitly religious texts (cf. Lancaster, 2015), and how 
these might inform the culturally situated discipline of 
psychology (cf. Friedman, 2017); to this end, through 
an interest in plural epistemologies (e.g., Ferrer, 2002) 
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and multiple ways of knowing (e.g., Hastings et al., 
2001), the field has a demonstrated interest in softening 
the bounds of its own cultural location. Yet a challenge 
inherent in this process is how to gain a broader and more 
flexible base of contingent assumptions without wholly 
undercutting the demonstrated benefits of a critical and 
scientific approach—that is, without jettisoning what 
makes transpersonal a psychology. 
Perennialist positions do affirm multiple cultural 
locations, but in order for this kind of approach to work 
it is necessary to transparently abandon any pretense of 
scientific scholarship. A perennialist approach asserts 
that one particular spiritual vision—one out of the 
thousands that have been crafted—is the correct account 
of all of human spirituality, and explains all other versions 
as lesser or partially informed variants of its own vision. 
In this way perennialism is necessarily and intrinsically 
hierarchical—even soft perennialism, despite Taylor’s 
(2016) claims to the contrary. As has been noted, such a 
stance is more typical of orthodox proselytizing religions 
than of any form of modern scholarship. Furthermore, 
one is asked to accede to this rather grand assertion 
without any direct evidence of the sort that can be shared 
with others. In other words, one has to examine their 
own personal experience and decide whether or not to 
accept the account of a person who claims to hold an 
authoritative insight. While such a conversion process 
happens routinely and appropriately within many of the 
world’s religions, it is rather less fitting to proffer it under 
the guise of a psychology.
On the other hand, some may feel that science is 
not an adequate container for a human psychology, and that 
spirituality is too vital and too powerful to be constrained 
by the requirements of such a mundane discipline. For 
example, Taylor (2017a) defends his metaphysically 
based approach by rejecting suggestions that the shared 
biological heritage of the human family might be in any 
way correlated with similarities in what he has identified 
as awakening experiences across a variety of religious and 
secular contexts; his concern is that these might constitute 
neuroscientific reductionism. It is apparently his rejection 
of any correlations with the body that create an urgent 
need for a perennialist position, for once biological factors 
are eliminated some other explanation for experiential 
similarities needs to be sought. 
Yet there may be more evidence for correlations 
between mental events and neural activity than Taylor 
has represented (e.g., Hinterberger, Zlabinger, & 
Blaser, 2014), and neurobiological theories need not be 
reductionist. If the whole person is an interconnected 
living system, then surely many of its aspects will reflect 
the processes of the whole. For example, an acupuncturist 
placing needles in the ear to treat organ systems of the body 
would seem to be seeing the whole interactively reflected 
in a part in a way that is not especially reductive. Seeing 
the nervous system as reflecting the whole person in a 
similar way does not require subscribing to a bottom-up 
biological perspective. Indeed, a whole person approach 
to psychology that specifically excluded neurobiology 
would be somewhat paradoxical. General similarities 
do seem to exist in some aspects of spiritual experience 
in various contexts, and while these appearances do not 
always survive closer examination or broader samplings, 
for similarities that do survive scrutiny there are better 
explanations than perennialism. A neurobiological 
theory greatly reduces any urgent need for explanation 
by some some form of perennialism, and is considerably 
more parsimonious. 
Furthermore, reductionism is not always 
problematic. Qualitative research, including Taylor’s 
(2012) own qualitative research, involves a process of 
reducing transcripts to themes; explanatory reduction 
enables complex information to be grasped in terms of 
salient features; even language entails reducing many 
unique phenomena to a single category such as dog or 
door. Sense perception itself requires that the “blooming, 
buzzing confusion” (James, 1890, p. 488) be reduced 
to manageable impressions, to which end education 
exerts great efforts. Naïve naturalistic or materialistic 
reductionism can be problematic (cf. MacDonald & 
Friedman, 2012), but the mere fact that a process involves 
some reduction should not make it immediately suspect.
Concerns among transpersonal scholars 
about an overly simplistic mechanical or materialist 
interpretation of spiritual experience are not wrong, nor 
are critiques of the limitations of empiricism misplaced 
(cf. Ferrer, 2014). The reach of science is limited, and 
there is by now a long history of effective critiques of 
rational empirical approaches including Foucault (1970), 
Derrida (1976), de Beauvoir (1949), Hartsock (1983), 
Lyotard (1984), and Rorty (1979), among many others; 
as a result it has become clear that science is a culturally, 
historically, and even gender situated project that cannot 
yield knowledge of a discrete and objective world. Nor is 
there an external standard by which knowledge systems 
can be compared, since all knowledge construction is 
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situated within similar contingencies. Yet critiques of 
science are implicitly predicated on its presence rather 
than serving as an adequate case for its absence; similarly, 
the fact that a liberal democracy allows criticism of 
government—often well deserved—is no argument for 
replacing it with an absolute monarch under whom no 
such dissent would be tolerated. In this sense, for the 
work of building a diverse psychology of the whole 
person, it is likely better to have a fallible science than an 
infallible religion. 
In this light, what is particularly troubling 
in Taylor’s (2017a) stance toward science is a false 
equivalency that takes the unavoidable presence of some 
metaphysical assumptions within science as license to 
invent systems that rely substantively and uncritcally 
on grand universal assumptions that are untestable by 
any empirical means. This approach carries no small 
risk: If applied to media it would suggest that since all 
news reporting inevitably has some bias, then outright 
fabrications, lies, and alternative facts are of equal status 
as careful journalism; it could likewise be used to argue 
that since most politicians may be corrupt to a greater 
or lesser degree, it matters not whether a shamelessly 
corrupt person is elected to high office. Any review of 
current or historical events will show such reasoning to 
be dangerously wrong. False equivalencies of this sort 
are characteristic of a simplistic, even opportunistic 
brand of post-truth postmodernism that appears to have 
gained some currency in Western societies during recent 
decades. At times more well intended versions of this 
same reasoning have appeared even within transpersonal 
circles. 
Despite this strain of thought, evidence matters 
and the quality of knowledge matters, even within a 
contingent system. Every day human lives and cultures 
depend on tested approaches to knowledge being 
implemented with as much integrity as possible. While 
ongoing critique and refinement of those approaches 
is part of maintaining their integrity, pointing to 
limitations does not warrant the cavalier discarding of 
effective if imperfect systems of knowledge construction. 
When I travel to and from my university, I drive an aging 
dark grey Honda sedan. It has a big dent in one fender 
where someone backed into it and fled. It no longer gets 
the gas mileage it used to, there is sun damage to the 
upholstery, and my mechanic tells me a couple of axles 
will need to be replaced. I would not rely on it to hold up 
offroad or across country. Though fallible and limited, I 
still find it quite reliable for most of my needs on a day 
to day basis. In a similar way, science does not need to be 
perfect in order to be generally reliable. 
Respect for the careful methods of science does 
not mean surrender to naïve materialism, or a physicalism 
that attempts to explain all phenomena in the stark terms 
of physics (Strawson, 2006). Nor does it imply, as Taylor 
(2017a) would have it, that transpersonal psychology 
would need to give up the study of psychic phenomena 
or nondual and transcendent states of consciousness. 
There is a very large difference between a subtle skill or 
experience or state of consciousness, and metaphysical 
interpretations of those phenomena or notions about 
ultimate sources of reality or all-pervasive spiritual forces. 
While the latter are speculative constructions that by their 
nature cannot be confirmed using any form of public 
evidence, the former can be studied  phenomenologically 
in ways that are congruent with scientific methods. 
What Taylor has advanced is an entirely false dichotomy 
between wholesale acceptance of spiritual-metaphysical 
speculations within psychology and the sterile constraints 
of logical positivism. There is ample middle ground that 
can be productive without falling prey to either of these 
extremes (cf. Friedman, 2015).
In addition, other strategies such as pursuing 
Tart’s (1972) suggestion that science has largely been 
implemented within the context of a single, conventional 
state of consciousness and carries a paradigm that reflects 
this, opens the possibility of applying the processes of 
scientific method within the context of other states of 
consciousness. If such states of consciousness can be 
adequately described and defined (Hartelius, 2015b), then 
applying scientific method within selected nonordinary 
states (cf. Varela, 1996) may help to overcome an overly 
mechanistic approach (cf. Cunningham, 2015) without 
abandoning the strengths of scientific scholarship or 
resorting to uplifting but critically vulnerable spiritual 
visions. 
What will serve is not new religious systems that 
posture as psychologies, but approaches that attempt the 
challenging work of understanding as much as possible 
of the dynamic processes of the whole person within the 
full range of human cultures and contexts. In this effort, 
good tools with long histories of powerful application 
such as critical thought and empirical evidence should not 
be reified, nor should they be too readily marginalized or 
disregarded simply because they exist within contingent 
systems that remain limited and imperfect.  
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Conclusion
Taylor’s (2016) work, like Wilber’s, is a thoughtful and inspiring spiritual vision that also takes the 
trouble to consider empirical data in the context of its 
metaphysical speculations. As with Wilber, Taylor’s 
project is not psychological, even though it appeals to 
psychological studies; as with intelligent design, it is not 
scientific. Whether or not a handful of contemporary 
academics support perennialist or essentialist positions 
does not make soft perennialism more critically sound. 
At the same time, Taylor deserves credit for accepting 
critique graciously and for engaging in scholarly debate 
in a vigorous and constructive manner. His approach may 
not make as much progress as one might hope on the 
difficult challenge of understanding human spirituality; 
as a new variant of perennialism rising in response to 
critiques of Wilber’s work, Taylor has retained many of 
the key shortcomings of perennialism. On the other hand, 
if his writings can provide inspiration and acceptance 
of diversity among popular readers in this subject area, 
then they serve a worthy cause—despite falling short on 
scholarship and remaining outside of psychology. 
 There is also some contribution to scholarship 
even in soft perennialism. Wilber’s work explicated a 
perennialist position so thoroughly that he generated careful 
critical examination of this strategy, and thereby largely 
dispelled the notion that such an approach might still hold 
some promise for psychology (Hartelius, 2015a). Taylor 
has extended this contribution by inviting consideration 
of an idea also advanced by Blackstone (2006), namely 
of a pervasive, immanent spiritual force as the source of 
spiritual experience. It seems likely this soft perennialist 
option will not be much more successful within psychology 
than Wilber’s version, but it has taken Taylor’s exposition 
of this idea for the matter to be carefully reviewed. There is 
much scientific research that ends in blind alleys and cul de 
sacs, and the work that identifies these is no less important 
than that which results in breakthrough findings in other 
directions.
 What deserves to be critiqued in Wilber and 
Taylor is the blurring of lines between psychology and 
religion. Even in what may be a postmetaphysical world 
populated by multiple knowledge frames, psychology 
cannot be radically reinvented without consideration of its 
historical and cultural contingencies. These contingencies 
are both its limitations and its ability to contain knowledge. 
The diversities of a multicultural world and the imperative 
to understand the whole human person demand that 
existing containers of knowledge be carefully reshaped 
and enlarged in more inclusive ways—not only for moral 
and political reasons but also because this enhances the 
integrity of psychological knowledge (Hartelius, 2014b). 
Yet such work demands more critical discernment and 
rigor, not less.
 For example, while it has become commonplace 
to suggest that religions such as Buddhism, Hinduism, or 
Christianity constitute or include psychologies of some 
sort, it is important to make a distinction between formal 
and informal uses of the term. In an informal sense, it is 
accurate and respectful to acknowledge that these venerated 
systems often include hermeneutically useful frames, 
wise observations, and pragmatic practices for addressing 
issues of mind and heart, life and relationship (Friedman, 
2017). This plainly does not make their metaphysical or 
soteriological constructs transferable into psychology, 
even though efforts to do just this persist (e.g., Crabb, 
1981; cf. Friedman, 2009, 2010). Yet when Wilber (e.g., 
2000) or Taylor (e.g., 2017b) blend New Age religions with 
psychological concepts, there is an implied claim that the 
entire product—including its explicitly religious ideas—is 
valid psychology in the formal sense of the academic and 
scientific discipline. This is inaccurate and misleading.
 Taylor (2017b), as Wilber before him, has offered 
his New Age religion to the public as psychology, and has 
submitted his thought for publication in a transpersonal 
journal—an action that merits response from the field. In 
order to do so constructively, this journal has published 
Taylor’s (2016) scholarly presentation of his work, notified 
him in advance that it would not be published without a 
critical response, and has offered him a generous forum 
for reply to this critique (Taylor, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c). 
In addition, this journal has extended an invitation to 
interested scholars to join and broaden the conversation. 
The intent is both that Taylor should have a forum to 
present his ideas clearly and engage with critique, and that 
the larger conversation of relations between science and 
religious views might be revisited. 
 Scholarship should strive to be accurate, trans-
parent, and fair. Direct and explicit critique of scholarly 
work is not attack, despite Taylor’s (2017a) complaint; 
articulation of possible shortcomings, along with robust 
debate, is how any scholarly field betters itself. Taylor’s 
concern that a critical response was published in the same 
issue is curious, given the fact that scholarly replies are 
frequently published in the same issue as target papers. 
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 In the spirit of entirely conventional critique it 
can be noted that Taylor’s work seems as yet somewhat 
in flux. For example, in his response Taylor (2017a) 
has acknowledged the metaphysical nature of the 
pervasive spirit force postulated in his approach, despite 
stating clearly in his 2016 paper that this force “is not 
metaphysical because it pervades the physical world” 
(p. 31). He claimed retrospectively (2017a) that he did 
not intend to imply that his approach does not make 
metaphysical claims, even though he had earlier avowed 
(2016) that it was “possible to advocate a softer form of 
perennialist approach without necessarily positing or 
adhering to a clearly defined metaphysical system” (pp. 19-
20). In his (2016) initial presentation he offered his work 
as perennialist, then later (2017a) he has expressed interest 
in changing its identity to essentialist. His writing does 
not reflect a full awareness of the relationship between 
evidence and metaphysical speculation, or appreciate that 
the latter by definition cannot be evidence-based. This 
sort of problematic ambiguity has led to a concern about 
whether Taylor’s advance into publishing popular books on 
his work as if it were psychology may have been premature 
(Hartelius, 2016). While Taylor (2017a) has characterized 
this concern as hostile, the fact that these basic issues are 
still being sorted out in his writing evidences the problem 
clearly enough; pointing to these issues is no more hostile 
than, say, copyediting. The question is not whether Taylor’s 
work is shoddy, to use his own (2017a) term, but whether 
it has been adequately vetted in scholarly circles to warrant 
broad public circulation as a product of the scientific field 
of psychology.
 Taylor’s (2016) spiritual vision is uplifting, 
his conviction is admirable, and his interest in 
empirical evidence is commendable. His work in 
the phenomenological study of a particular type of 
experience may be important if properly validated. 
These merits do not save his soft perennialism from 
critical shortcomings that may well be insurmountable 
within his current framework. The proposal to rename 
his approach essentialist phenomenology does not change 
the structure of the work, which remains perennialist 
and metaphysical, with phenomenology playing only 
an ancillary role in a much larger schema. Neither 
adjustments in terminology nor minor updates and 
expansions of Taylor’s selective literature review will 
remedy this. His case is not strengthened by empirical 
evidence that merely permits rather than supports his 
speculative ideas. Since these ideas are already problematic 
on other grounds, and because better explanations exist, 
the case for his version of perennialism remains largely 
unconvincing. Perennialist spiritual philosophies remain 
unworkable within psychology, and Taylor’s version is no 
exception.
 One might ask why Taylor even wishes to situate 
his work within psychology—why his most recent book, 
for example, is subtitled, The Psychology of Spiritual 
Awakening (Taylor, 2017b)—when his writings reflect 
such deep suspicion of neuroscientific explanations and 
minimal regard for scholarly standards of what constitutes 
evidence. The role of spiritual teacher, as exemplified by 
Eckhart Tolle who has written the introduction to his 
book, is perfectly respectable and more in keeping with 
the substance and thrust of Taylor’s efforts. What deserves 
careful scrutiny is occasions when a spiritual teacher 
inappropriately incorporates a bit of scientific research 
into a spiritual vision and then offers the resulting product 
as psychology. It is doubtful that bad science makes for 
better spirituality. However, Taylor would encounter no 
critique here if he were to refrain from representing his 
vision as some version of psychology, which it clearly 
is not. Transpersonal psychology has been down this 
same road with Ken Wilber’s work, which ended with a 
popularized metaphysical theory of everything that has 
little credibility within the serious scholarship of any 
discipline, let alone psychology. The field would do well 
to apply lessons learned from this history to Taylor’s new 
version of much the same approach.
 There is richness, depth, and subtlety to the 
human person that psychology attempts but often fails 
to fully capture. These omissions, though sometimes 
peripheral from the perspective of psychology, are often 
central to what motivates, inspires, and transforms 
human life. Transpersonal approaches to the mind and 
to states of consciousness hold the opportunity and 
perhaps even the responsibility to contribute somatic, 
phenomenal, relational, and transformative facets to the 
wider discipline; doing so may support a broadening 
of psychology so that it becomes less focused on the 
Western individual and more inclusive of the whole 
human person and of broader ranges of communities and 
cultures. Perhaps it will become possible to acknowledge 
that perennialist strategies  such as those of Wilber and 
Taylor, while seeming an appealing shortcut to such goals, 
have failed to deliver. Efforts invested in inventing and 
defending new versions of this ephemeral, universalizing 
grand theory approach (cf. Wright, 1996) might be better 
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spent developing more specific work that can contribute to 
the field modestly, pragmatically, and in socially engaged 
ways (cf. Brooks, 2010; Ferrer, 2011a; Friedman, 2015).
 In this process, transpersonal psychology 
requires active debate in order to progress, just as any 
other academic field. The values that it needs to live up to 
are scholarly, not spiritual, because it is a psychology, not a 
religious movement. The field examines mystical, spiritual, 
and other exceptional human experiences and capacities 
in a scientific frame at least partly corrected for artificial 
prejudices introduced by unacknowledged modernist 
assumptions. As such, transpersonal psychology strives 
for inclusion of viewpoints, cultures, traditions, genders, 
ways of knowing, and varieties of lived experience, but not 
for the incorporation of New Age religions—or any other 
religions—as a part of psychology.
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